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Non-Technical Summary
When making decisions, individuals tend collect information on decision mak-
ers in reference groups. Such behavior may be rational for several reasons and
may be explained with different hypotheses on how individuals behave when
making decisions. This paper deals with the question how policy makers in
the local jurisdictions of a federal system influence each other in decisions to
adopt policy innovations. In the theoretical literature on policy innovations
and policy experimentation in decentralized political systems, two competing
hypotheses on mutual interdependencies among local jurisdictions have been
discussed. The first one says that jurisdictions positively influence each other
in the adoption of policy innovations. One possible reason is that decision
makers learn from each other, or, due to reputational concerns, governments
may benefit from choosing actions similar to those in reference jurisdictions.
The second hypothesis is based on horizontal information externalities be-
tween jurisdictions. Local policy experiments provide information that is
useful for all governments, and therefore for any given jurisdiction an in-
centive exists to free-ride on experimentation activities of others. Within
reference groups, jurisdictions with a strong predisposition for the adption
of a new political technology would then negatively affect other jurisdictions’
willingness to experiment with the new policy.
In this paper, data on policy innovations in a large sample of local juris-
dictions are used to test for spatial interactions between jurisdictions. The
jurisdictions we are looking at are US school districts, and the policy innova-
tion under consideration is inter-district public school choice. The empirical
results suggest that the districts’ predispositions towards the adoption of
school choice are strongly interdependent. A given districts probability to
adopt school choice is substantially higher if neighboring districts are more
likely to participate. The paper thus rejects the free-riding hypothesis and
supports the view that in federal systems the diffusion of policy innovations
is stimulated by horizontal interactions between jurisdictions.
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Abstract
Before making difficult decisions, individuals tend to collect information on
decision makers in reference groups. With respect to policy innovations in
a decentralized public sector, this may give rise to positive neighborhood
influence on adoption decisions. On the other hand, due to learning exter-
nalities, an incentive exists to free-ride on policy experiments of others. In
this paper, U.S. data on school district policies are used to show that with
respect to policy experiments, decision makers indeed are heavily affected
by decision makers in reference groups. The results suggest that if a given
district’s neighbors’ expected benefits from adopting a new policy increase,
this substantially increases the original district’s probability of adoption. The
paper thus rejects the free-riding hypothesis and supports the view that in
federal systems the diffusion of policy innovations is stimulated by horizontal
interactions between jurisdictions.
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1 Introduction
Recent research has put forward the idea that when making decisions, indi-
viduals are affected by the attitude or actual behavior of other individuals in
certain reference groups. Collecting information on benchmark agents may
be rational for a number of reasons. First of all, since it is costly to evaluate
alternatives and to find out which one is to be pursued, individuals may seek
to benefit from information gathered by others. A straightforward example
is what Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) in their taxonomy of social learning and
behavioral convergence call rational observational learning: individuals learn
by rational Bayesian inference on information conveyed in the behavior of
others. Scharfstein and Stein (1990), for instance, discuss herd behavior at
financial markets. They show that it may be in the best interest of man-
agers concerned about their reputation to ignore their private information
and to mimic investment decisions of other managers. Katz and Shapiro
(1986) argue that with respect to technology adoption, network externalities
may motivate decision makers to choose similar actions. Brock and Durlauf
(2001) provide a model of discrete choice with social interactions, where indi-
vidual utility directly depends on the choices of others in a reference group.
In the context of political decisions, Besley and Case (1995) argue that it
may be rational for office-motivated governments to choose policies similar
to those in benchmark jurisdictions if voters use relative rather than absolute
performance for their inference on the quality of locally provided services.
A particularly interesting and practically relevant application for theories of
behavioral convergence is the horizontal diffusion of policy innovations in fed-
eral systems. It has often been claimed that a decentralized political system
with a large number of independent local jurisdictions offers favorable con-
ditions for policy experiments and the implementation of policy innovations.
Oates (1999), for instance, gives an optimistic view of ‘laboratory federal-
ism’, where many jurisdictions simultaneously engage in policy experiments
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and where jurisdictions learn from the experience made by others. However,
as Strumpf (2002) points out, in the context of experiments and innovative
activities, learning externalities will create a standard sort of incentive for
free-riding on other jurisdictions’ experimentation efforts. If new and com-
plex policies are invented and tested, it will usually take some time until
information about outcomes is publicly available. Then, if a new political
technology becomes available and jurisdictions tend to free-ride on experi-
mentation and testing activities of others, we would expect not to observe
behavioral convergence between similarly situated jurisdictions. Instead, in
the early stage of the diffusion process, we would expect a typical jurisdic-
tion to stick to a traditional policy given that certain benchmark jurisdictions
bear the cost of experimentation.
The purpose of this paper is twofold. First of all, evidence will be provided
suggesting that similarly situated local jurisdictions in federal systems indeed
tend to affect each other in the decision whether to experiment with new
political technologies. Hence, the influence of benchmark jurisdictions seems
to be important for the diffusion of policy innovations. Secondly, we will
test whether the behavior of local governments is more heavily affected by
neighborhood influence, i.e. by incentives to follow the model of benchmark
jurisdictions, or by incentives to free-ride on experimentation efforts in other
jurisdictions.
In our analysis, we use data from the Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS)
1993-94 of the National Center for Education Statistics on policy innovations
in a large number of local school districts in the U.S. More specifically, we
will investigate the adoption of inter-district public school choice by school
districts in five American states a few years after districts were given the
power to open up their borders for transfer students. Since school districts
are local jurisdictions, we assume that reference groups are defined accord-
ing to geographical proximity. More specifically, for any given district, the
reference group is defined as all local school districts belonging to the same
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county. Using an approach proposed by Case (1992), we then estimate a
spatial probit in the cross-section of districts. The results indicate that the
school districts’ predispositions towards policies of school choice are strongly
interdependent even if we control for a large number of district characteristics
describing local preferences. The probability of adoption of school choice poli-
cies is substantially higher for districts which are exposed to neighbors with
a strong predisposition towards adoption. This finding suggests that free-
riding on other districts’ effort to experiment with the new policy has not
been a prevalent phenomenon in the diffusion of inter-district school choice.
The paper thus supports the view that in federal systems the diffusion of pol-
icy innovations is stimulated by horizontal interactions between jurisdictions
immediately after new political technologies have been invented.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, the
estimation approach is discussed. Section 3 describes inter-district public
school choice as a policy innovation and discusses potential factors affect-
ing political preferences of school districts. Section 4 presents the data and
estimation results, and section 5 concludes.
2 Estimation approach
Given the mere number of almost 15,000 school districts in the U.S., it seems
reasonable to assume that decision makers at the district level tend to perceive
the situation in nearby districts as particularly informative with regard to
the prospects of new policies. Thus, the estimation approach of Hautsch and
Klotz (2003), where neighbors are defined in an abstract social space, does
not seem to be appropriate for the current analysis. Instead, the analysis
will rely on a spatial probit specification introduced by Case (1992). The
model has been developed for the cross-sectional analysis of discrete choice
decisions and is particularly well suited to be applied in a situation where, due
to sampling, the information on the spatial distribution of adoption decisions
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is incomplete. Nevertheless, the model allows for the identification of spatial
interactions between jurisdictions given a spatial structure which is defined
according to some broad measure of geographical proximity.
In the following, Case’s model is briefly recapitulated, with emphasis on
some slight modifications to adjust it to our needs. As in the standard
latent variable model, the binary decision of each district depends on the
expected benefit from adopting school choice, Y ∗i . The structural spatial
auto-regressive model for the predisposition towards adoption is
Y ∗i = φWiY
∗ +Xiβ + ui, (1)
where Wi is a (1×N) vector of spatial weights and Y ∗ is the (N × 1) vector
of expected benefits from adoption for all N districts. For the moment, let ui
be an i.i.d. error with zero mean and variance σ2u. In this model, a positive
φ would mean that the districts’ predispositions towards open enrollment
are positively interdependent. Thus, if a given district’s school board had a
positive attitude towards the adoption of school choice, this would positively
affect the attitude in neighboring districts, and, hence, increase the probabil-
ity of adoption among neighbors. Now suppose that each district i belongs
to some county m(i) and that nm(i) is the number of districts in m(i). Using
a block-diagonal matrix of spatial weights W which, for all i = 1, . . . , N , as-
signs the districts inm(i) as neighbors to i, i’s predisposition can be rewritten
in a reduced-form equation
Y ∗i = %m(i)Xiβ + ϑm(i)X¯m(i)β + %m(i)ui + ϑm(i)u¯m(i), (2)
where X¯m(i) is the vector of mean characteristics for districts in m(i), u¯m(i)
is the mean of errors in m(i), %m(i) = (nm(i)− 1)/(φ+ nm(i)− 1), and ϑm(i) =
nm(i)φ/[(1−φ)(φ+nm(i)−1)]. In a variance normalized version, eq. (2) can be
estimated as a spatial probit using standard maximum likelihood techniques.
As noted above, the estimations presented in this paper utilize information
on school district policies from a survey covering only a sample of districts.
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Note that, due to the appearance of districts’ mean characteristics in eq. (2),
data on explanatory variables are required for all districts.1 It should also be
noted that the identification of the endogenous ‘social effect’ φ rests on the
assumption that no exogenous social effect is present in the structural form
eq. (1), i.e. districts’ predispositions do not directly depend on the mean of
exogenous variables across districts in the same county (see Manski 1993 for
a discussion.).
The spatial auto-regressive model can be extended to incorporate spatially
correlated shocks. This may be useful, because spatial correlation in adoption
decisions could be driven by spatially correlated shocks. Not accounting for
spatial error dependence could then lead to false conclusions. To account for
spatial error dependence, errors in eq. (1) are assumed to follow
ui = ρWiu+ ²i, (3)
where now ²i is an i.i.d. error.
Before the data and the estimation of the model is described, it is useful
to briefly discuss inter-district open enrollment as a local policy innovation
in the U.S.
3 Inter-district open enrollment as a local
policy innovation
As mentioned above, the policy innovation under investigation in this paper
is inter-district public school choice, sometimes also called inter-district open
enrollment. Basically, it allows students to attend a public school in a school
district other than the district of residence. In the U.S., school choice poli-
cies have been a much discussed topic of educational reform in recent years.
The significance of the inter-district version of school choice comes from the
1In Case (1992) survey data are used, too, but mean characteristics are estimated based
on the information on districts in the sample.
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fact that it will tend to increase competition for students between districts.
In many states, school districts have, at least to some degree, discretionary
power to determine whether they want to participate in statewide choice pro-
grams. Of course, school boards as local authorities in individual districts
will rather be interested in the effects of school choice on the number and
the composition of students in local schools than in potential overall effects
of increased competition on school productivity. A valid model of the dif-
fusion of open enrollment policies among districts must therefore take into
account the crucial factors affecting the districts’ willingness to participate
in statewide inter-district choice programs.
The analysis will focus on district policies in Arkansas, California, Idaho,
Massachusetts and Ohio. In 1993, 37.3% of all local school districts in these
states reported to admit non-resident students at local schools.2 In all five
states, fiscal incentives for participation were set by rewarding receiving dis-
tricts by additional funds. Participating districts could thus hope to raise
additional revenues by attracting transfer students.
A reason for hesitation in switching to a policy of open enrollment may be
limited capacity in local schools. In general, districts with crowded schools
will be less willing to allow for the enrollment of transfer students. Further-
more, crowded schools are perceived as less attractive by potential transfer
students and, from an ex-ante perspective, decrease the probability that the
district will be successful in attracting non-resident students.
Another factor influencing participation of districts in public school choice
may be the districts’ location relative to large central cities. Traditionally,
suburban school districts have been opposing the idea of inter-district open
enrollment (Ryan and Heise 2002). Given their social and economic charac-
teristics, suburban schools are, on average, better than urban schools, and
residents in suburban districts tend to perceive inter-district transfers as a
threat to the superior quality of local public schools. Furthermore, apart from
2Percentage adjusted for sampling weights.
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a districts location relative to central urban areas, the racial composition of
local public schools alone as well as the income of an average resident house-
hold may affect districts’ predisposition towards open enrollment. Finally,
the analysis shall account for the fact that in the sample there are three dif-
ferent types of districts with regard to the grades served. In Arkansas, Idaho
and Ohio, all districts are unified school districts and (at least potentially)
serve all grades. In California and Massachusetts, unified school districts
serve students in elementary as well as secondary schools, while elementary
and high school districts are more specialized.
Based on the preceding discussion, we include as control variables in our
empirical specification the student-teacher ratio (STR) as a variable measur-
ing the capacity for enrollment of transfer students; the district’s revenue per
student (REV ) as a measure for fiscal stress; the share of minority students in
local public schools (MST )3; the median household income (MHI ); and four
dummy variables, one for districts in large or mid-size central cities (DCITY ),
one for suburban school districts (DSUB), one for elementary school districts
(DEL) and one for high school districts (DHI).
Apart from absolute characteristics as discussed so far, the predisposition
towards open enrollment may also depend on the district’s position relative
to its geographical neighbors. Due to transportation to more distant schools
being either unavailable or prohibitively costly, school districts will be able
to attract students only from nearby districts. The relative attractiveness
of each district for non-resident students and the characteristics of transfer
students whose application for enrollment in local schools is anticipated will
therefore depend on the district’s relevant characteristics relative to its neigh-
bors. To capture this, we construct two additional control variables. The first
one shall pick up the relative position with respect to the share of minority
students, and the second is meant to account for the relative income position.
Let RX be a district’s relative position with respect to characteristic X. It is
3MST is defined as one minus the share of white non-Hispanic students.
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conveniently defined as the difference between the district’s own X and the
mean of X for all contiguous districts, weighted by district enrollment.4
4 Data, estimation and results
4.1 The data
The data used in the analysis are a sample of school districts in Arkansas,
California, Idaho, Massachusetts and Ohio. All five selected states share the
common feature that they established inter-district choice programs between
1989 and 1993 and that districts were given discretionary power to decide
whether they would admit nonresident students at local schools.5 The infor-
mation on school districts’ open enrollment policies is from the Schools and
Staffing Survey (SASS) 1993-94, providing data on a large sample of local
school districts.6 The survey asked districts whether they had ‘a choice pro-
gram in which students can enroll in another school or district outside their
attendance area without justification based on individual special needs’. Dis-
tricts which affirmed were then asked whether the program allowed for enroll-
ment of students from other districts. In the empirical analysis, the answer
to this last question is used to determine which districts did participate in
inter-district open enrollment in the 1993-94 school year.
Data on the control variables are from Public Education Finance Data of
the Bureau of the Census (revenues and district type indicator), the School
District Demographic System of the National Center for Education Statistics
(NCES) (median household income) and the Common Core of Data of the
4In California and Massachusetts, elementary and high school districts sometimes overlap.
Districts are defined to be contiguous if they share a common border or a common territory.
5Choice programs started in Arkansas and Ohio in school year 1989/90, in Massachusetts
and Idaho in 1991/92, and in California in 1993.
6To access the data, refer to National Center for Education Statistics (1998). For technical
information, see National Center for Education Statistics (1996).
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NCES (enrollment, number of minority students, number of teachers, and
urbanicity indicator).
4.2 Estimation and results
For the five selected states, the Schools and Staffing Survey 1993-94 provides
information on open enrollment policies in 653 local school districts. For the
empirical analysis, the sample was reduced to 511 districts.7 Table 1 provides
some descriptive statistics on the explanatory variables.
Before estimation results are presented and discussed it should be stressed
that the districts covered in the Schools and Staffing Survey are selected
on the basis of a complex survey design. Thus, the analysis is not based
on a random sample. We account for the effect of the survey design on the
composition of the sample by including the inverse of the sampling probability
as a weight for the contribution of each district in the likelihood function.
Since the sample design may also induce unknown correlation in errors, robust
standard errors for parameter estimates are computed using a Huber-White
formula for probit models.8
The first step in the empirical analysis is a simple baseline regression where
we completely ignore the potential impact the predispositions of neighbors
may have on the attitude towards open enrollment in any given district. The
721 districts had to be excluded from the sample since they have no neighbors (four
districts are islands and 17 represent a whole county). Another 14 districts had missing values
for explanatory variables. In a next step, districts with less than 800 students were removed
from the sample. The reason for doing so is the presumption that the political behavior of a
very small district will resemble that of an average school more closely than that of a larger
district. The threshold of 800 students was determined by increasing the minimum number
of students by increments of 100 (starting from zero) until each of the remaining districts had
at least two schools. Finally, in order to identify influential observations, a linear probability
model was estimated using the remaining 539 observations. Based on the approach proposed
by Krasker, Kuh, and Welsch (1983), 28 observations were removed. This left 511 school
districts for the analysis.
8See Wooldridge (2002, p. 496) for details.
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Table 1
Adoption of school choice - descriptive statistics on district characteristics
Explanatory variables Meana Std.Dev.a Min. Max.
Central city DCITY .112 .316 0.00 1.00
Suburb DSUB .298 .458 0.00 1.00
Elementary school district DEL .083 .276 0.00 1.00
High school district DHI .033 .178 0.00 1.00
Student-teacher ratio STR 19.6 3.50 11.9 29.5
Revenues REV b 4.99 1.18 2.97 11.5
Share of minority stud. MST .207 .254 0.00 .960
Median household income MHI b 39.2 12.9 17.1 98.2
Relative pos. MST RMST -.045 .183 -.707 .698
Relative pos. MHI RMHI
b 1.49 9.40 -35.4 65.4
a Weighted by inverse of sampling probabilities; b In thousands of dollars.
baseline regression is meant as a first, albeit crude test whether the approach
of estimating a discrete choice model for the adoption of open enrollment
policies with the given set of control variables is meaningful at all. Table 2
reports the results of a weighted maximum likelihood estimation of a standard
probit framework, where the latent variable model is specified as
Y ∗i = Xi β + ui
= β0 + β1DCITY + β2DSUB + β3STR + β4REV
+ β5MST + β6MHI + β7RMST + β8RMHI
+ β9DEL + β10DHI + β11D1 + · · ·+ β14D4 + ui. (4)
D1 to D4 represent state dummies. Their inclusion in eq. (4) accounts
for all kinds of state-specific influences on the predisposition towards open
enrollment, such as differences in school choice laws, state-specific fiscal in-
centives for districts promoting participation in open enrollment programs or
the length of time the program was in place at the time of data collection.
10
Table 2
Adoption of school choice - weighted probit estimates
Explanatory variables Estimates Slopea
Large or mid-size city, DCITY .237 .083
(.218)
Urban fringe of large -.156 -.054
or mid-size city, DSUB (.205)
Student-teacher ratio, STR -.090? -.032
(.047)
Revenues per student, REV -.247?? -.086
(.100)
Share of minority students, MST -1.75?? -.611
(.484)
Median household income, MHI -.007 -.002
(.009)
Diff. between own and 2.02 ?? .706
contiguous districts’ MST (.609)
Diff. between own and .024 ? .008
contiguous districts’ MHI (.013)
Log-likelihood -312.24
Percent correctly predicted 66.7
Actual adoptions
Yes No
Yes 119 82
Predicted adoptions
No 88 222
aAverage of estimated individual changes in proba-
bilities, weighted by inverse of sampling probabilities;
?? Significant at the 5% level; ? Significant at the 10%
level; Robust standard errors in parentheses; Additional
regressors: DEL, DHI and state dummies.
In Table 2, the left column displays the parameter estimates for the specifica-
tion in eq. (4), and the right column provides the average partial effects, i.e.
the sample averages of estimated changes in the probability of adoption as-
sociated with a change in the explanatory variable. A quick inspection of the
results shows that districts with crowded schools, as we presumed, seem to be
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less willing to open up local schools for non-resident students. Furthermore,
districts with lower revenues per student are more inclined towards open en-
rollment than high revenue districts. Another noteworthy result is that both
the absolute and the relative position of districts with respect to the share of
minority students have an impact on the attitude towards adoption. While a
higher absolute share of minority students significantly lowers the probabil-
ity of adoption, the relative position has the opposite effect: an increase in
the difference between own and contiguous districts’ share of minority stu-
dents will increase the probability that transfer students are admitted at local
schools. Finally, once we control for the share of minority students and the
districts’ geographical position relative to central cities, the absolute position
in median household income does not have any effect on open enrollment
policies. However, the coefficient of the relative income position is weakly
significant, suggesting that an increase in the difference between own and
contiguous districts’ median household income will increase the probability
that non-resident students are admitted at local schools.
The significance of a number of district characteristics together with the
fact that the model correctly predicts two thirds of all adoption decisions
suggests that all explanatory variables together provide a strong signal for
the predisposition of school districts to participate in open enrollment pro-
grams. Thus we can hope that the spatial probit, where we rely on neighbors’
mean characteristics in order to identify the impact of neighbors predisposi-
tions towards adoption, is capable to provide significant results on potential
interdependencies among districts.
Results for the probit with spatial correlation in the latent variable are
presented in Table 3. They suggest that predispositions towards adoption
of inter-district open enrollment are positively interdependent among school
districts, and that the impact of neighbors’ predispositions on the proba-
bility of adoption is substantial. For an average district, a one percentage
point increase in the share of neighboring districts for which participation in
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Table 3
Adoption of school choice - weighted spatial probit estimates
Probit with spatial Probit with spatial
correlation in latent correlation in latent
variable only variable and errors
Explanatory variables Estimates Slopea Estimates Slopea
Neighbors’ .428 ?? .148b .485 ?? .167b
predisposition, φ (.193) (.217)
Large or mid-size city, DCITY .165 .059 .151 .055
(.214) (.207)
Urban fringe of large -.097 -.035 -.084 -.031
or mid-size city, DSUB (.186) (.180)
Student-teacher ratio, STR -.087?? -.031 -.079? -.029
(.042) (.043)
Revenues per student, REV -.214?? -.076 -.188? -.068
(.089) (.101)
Share of minority -1.09?? -.390 -.973?? -.354
students, MST (.458) (.473)
Mean household -.004 -.001 -.004 -.001
income, MHI (.007) (.006)
Diff. between own and 1.77 ?? .631 1.70 ?? .617
contiguous districts’ MST (.557) (.523)
Diff. between own and .023 ? .008 .022 ?? .008
contiguous districts’ MHI (.012) (.011)
Spatial correlation - - -.388? -
in errors, ρ (.222)
Log-likelihood -309.20 -308.68
Percent correctly predicted 66.7 66.3
Actual adoptions Actual adoptions
Yes No Yes No
Yes 118 81 Yes 119 84
Predicted adoptions
No 89 223 No 88 220
aAverage of estimated individual changes in probabilities, weighted by inverse
of sampling probabilities; bComputed using predicted adoptions of neighbors.
See text for details; ?? Significant at the 5% level; ? Significant at the 10%
level; Robust standard errors in parentheses; Additional regressors: DEL, DHI
and state dummies.
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open enrollment is anticipated increases the probability of adoption by 0.15%.
This means that a district with a share of neighbors expected to adopt school
choice which is one standard deviation above that of an otherwise identical
reference district is about 6% more likely to admit non-resident students at
local schools.9 Thus, in their open enrollment policies, school districts as
local jurisdictions have been heavily affected by the anticipated behavior of
neighboring districts. Since the districts in the sample did not have much
experience with open enrollment at the time of data collection, the results
derived from the spatial probit are evidence against the hypothesis that ju-
risdictions tend to free-ride on policy experiments of others. Of course, some
school districts may have been engaged in some sort of free-riding activity,
but the results of the spatial probit suggest that for the average district, the
incentive to choose similar open enrollment policies as in neighboring districts
was much stronger than the incentive to exploit information externalities.
Apart from the predisposition of neighbors, a number of district charac-
teristics affect the discrete choice decision whether to participate in open
enrollment. The coefficient of the student-teacher ratio is highly significant
and shows the expected sign. An additional student per teacher lowers the
probability that open enrollment policies are adopted by 3.1%. At the same
time, higher revenues per student make districts less willing to participate in
inter-district school choice. $ 1,000 of additional revenues per student make
the average district 7.6% less likely to admit non-resident students. Fur-
thermore, a one percentage point increase in a district’s share of minority
9The estimate for the strength of neighbors’ influence is computed as follows. The model
predicts an innovation, i.e. Yˆi = 1, if Yˆ
∗
i > 0 and Yˆi = 0 otherwise, where, in matrix
notation, Yˆ ∗ = (I−φˆW )−1Xβˆ. The estimated marginal change in the probability of adoption
associated with a change in the share of neighbors who are expected to participate is then
given as
φˆ N−1
N∑
i=1
f(φˆWiYˆ +Xiβˆ),
where f is the density of the standard normal distribution.
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students, with all other things being equal, makes the district 0.4% less likely
to adopt open enrollment. This may reflect the fact that districts with a
higher share of minority students will, on average, expect to be less success-
ful in attracting students from elsewhere. Thus, it may not be worthwhile for
these districts to adjust their policies towards open enrollment regulations.
Interestingly enough, the coefficient of the relative position in the share of
minority students shows the opposite sign. Increasing the difference between
own and contiguous districts’ share of minority students by one percentage
point increases the probability of adoption by 0.6%. This is in line with the
argument that districts with more favorable social conditions relative to their
immediate neighbors tend to perceive inter-district transfers as a threat to
the quality of local public schools and, hence, are less willing to accept the
enrollment of transfer students. Finally, the partial effect of the relative po-
sition in median household income is weakly significant. The average partial
effect indicates that an increase in the difference between own and contigu-
ous districts’ median household income by $ 1,000 increases the probability
of adoption of open enrollment by 0.8%.
As mentioned in section 2, it is important to test for spatial error depen-
dence as a potential source for spatial correlation in districts’ predispositions
towards adoption of school choice. We do this by estimating a weighted probit
with spatial correlation both in the latent variable and in errors according to
eq. (3). The output for his regression is displayed as the second set of results
in Table 3. The first and most important thing to note is that allowing for
spatial error dependence does not break the link between neighbors’ predis-
positions. On the contrary, the link becomes even stronger: For an average
district, a one percentage point increase in the share of neighboring districts
expected to adopt open enrollment now increases the probability of adoption
by 0.17% compared to 0.15% in the model without spatial error dependence.
A district with a share of neighbors expected to participate which is one
standard deviation above that of an otherwise identical reference district is
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7% more likely to admit transfer students. At the same time, weak evidence
is found for the presence of negative spatial correlation. The remaining para-
meter estimates are of similar size as before and need not be discussed again.
Note that accounting for spatial error dependence does only marginally in-
crease the log-likelihood of the model, and that doing so slightly reduces the
percentage of correctly predicted decisions. We conclude that there is an in-
significant amount of (negative) spatial correlation in errors which is unable
to explain the strong positive spatial correlation in predispositions towards
adoption of open enrollment policies.
Collectively, the results of the spatial probit estimations suggest that after
open enrollment had been invented as an additional opportunity for local
school districts to compete for students and funds, the attitude of district
decision makers was heavily affected by predispositions of neighboring dis-
tricts towards the new policy. The hypothesis that local policy innovation in
a decentralized public sector is hampered by an incentive for decision mak-
ers to free-ride on experimentation activities in other jurisdictions is clearly
rejected by the evidence on the spatial distribution of adoption decisions.
School districts as independent local jurisdictions did positively interact in
the diffusion of inter-district open enrollment in the U.S., and the impact of
neighboring districts on the adoption probability was substantial.
5 Conclusion
It is in the nature of the political process that policy makers often face diffi-
cult discrete choice decisions. Particularly interesting and practically relevant
examples are decisions to experiment with new political concepts. This pa-
per provides evidence on the behavior of local governments in the adoption
of a significant policy innovation in a large number of local jurisdictions.
There are theoretical arguments both in favor of behavioral convergence, i.e.
neighborhood influence in the adoption of policy innovations, and in favor
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of behavioral divergence due to incentives to free-ride on policy experiments
of others. The evidence provided in this paper suggests that the free-riding
incentives are dominated and that in their adoption decisions, local govern-
ments are positively affected by anticipated decisions in benchmark jurisdic-
tions. This supports the view that in federal systems and, more generally in
systems with a decentralized public sector, the diffusion of policy innovations
is stimulated by horizontal interactions between jurisdictions.
Still, there are many open questions with respect to decentralized decision
making and the diffusion of policy innovations. For instance, in the iden-
tification of spatial interactions between jurisdictions, this paper relies on
the spatial distribution of adoption decisions in a cross-section of local ju-
risdictions. Clearly, for future empirical research, it should be worthwhile
to also take into account dynamic aspects of the diffusion of new political
technologies.
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